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Target Rebates Induce Non-Rational Loyalty in Consumers
‡ 
by 





Legal regulations concerning unfair competition and antitrust policy often still rely on the as-
sumption of a rational consumer, although other models may better account for people’s deci-
sion behavior. We investigate the influence of target rebates on consumers based on the alter-
native Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), both theoretically and experimentally. CPT pre-
dicts that target rebates could harm consumers by impeding rational switching from an in-
cumbent to an outside option (e.g., a market entrant). In a repeated trading task, participants 
decided whether or not to enter a target rebate scheme and to continue buying within that 
scheme. Reaching the target was uncertain. Target rebates considerably reduced the likelihood 
that participants switched to a higher-payoff outside option later. We conclude that target re-
bates may inflict substantial harm on consumers and might even have an underestimated po-
tential to foreclose consumer markets. 
Keywords: Consumer protection, Rebates, Unfair competition, Antitrust policy, Rebates,   
Biases, Prospect theory 
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Introduction 
“Children”, the Supreme Court wrote in its FTC vs. R.F.Keppel judgment dealing with a pro-
motion scheme turning a simple purchase of candy into a lottery, are “too young to be capable 
of exercising an intelligent judgment of the transaction.” Evidence from both psychology and 
economics shows that irrational behavior and biases in judgments and decision making are, of 
course, not limited to children, and that adults (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and even expert 
decision makers (Koehler, Brenner, & Griffin, 2002) have serious trouble to judge intelligent-
ly in situations of risk and uncertainty (see Rabin, 1998, for a review). It has, for example, 
been shown that the prices to buy or sell a product are dependent on whether persons own the 
good or not (i.e., endowment effect; Thaler, 1980); that prices of consumers and professional 
car dealers are anchored on arbitrary prices (e.g., Mussweiler, Strack, & Pfeiffer, 2000; Rus-
so, 2010), and that consumers systematically distort attribute information concerning products 
(e.g., Russo, Meloy, & Medvec, 1998; D. Simon, Krawczyk, & Holyoak, 2004).  Being wide-
ly accepted in psychological decision research, the systematic deviations from rational choice 
led economists to conclude that the “orthodox economic model […] does a poor job of pre-
dicting the behavior of the average consumer” (Thaler, 1980, p. 58).  Alternative models have 
been suggested to account better for consumer behavior. The most influential approaches are 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and its advancements (Schmidt, Starmer, & 
Sugden, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992); and strategy selection models (Beach & Mitch-
ell, 1978; Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999) in the tradition of the 
bounded rationality approach (H. A. Simon, 1955). 
Findings on deviations from rational choice assumptions have been the backbone of the be-
havioral law and economics approach (e.g., Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, 1998; Korobkin, 2003; 
Rachlinski, 2000, 2004).  The advanced understanding of decision processes has been fruitful-
ly applied to decision making in court (e.g., Daftary-Kapur, Dumas, & Penrod, 2010; Englich, 
Mussweiler, & Strack, 2005, 2006; Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2000, 2007; Hastie, 
Schkade, & Payne, 1999a, 1999b; Rachlinski, 2000), but also to various public policy issues. 
The prevalence of biases has, for instance, been shown for peoples’ thinking about taxes 
(McCaffery & Baron, 2006) and suggestions have been made to debias through law (Jolls & 
Sunstein, 2006).  Interestingly, however, the findings have not been very influential in unfair 
competition law or antitrust (but see Incardona & Poncibò, 2007). This fact is all the more 
surprising as consumers are important players in both fields of law. And as it has been shown 
in the research mentioned above, it is the consumer in particular who often lacks the resources 
and technology to overcome difficulties in dealing with risk and ambiguity. In the current pa-
per, we make an empirical contribution that bridges this gap by investigating the influence of 
targeted rebates on consumers’ behavior using Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992) as a theoretical basis.  
Targeted rebates have been argued to appeal unduly to the gambling sentiments and to com-
promise the rationality of the purchasing decision, making such rebates illegal under Art. 4 of 
the directive concerning unfair business-to-consumer practices in the internal market   3
2005/29/EC and its corresponding norms in the law of the member states (Köhler, 2008). 
Similarly, US law bans practices inflicting substantial harm on consumers. We investigate 
whether specific rebate schemes take advantage of customers’ irrationality, which might 
cause financial loss to them.  In antitrust, a certain antagonism even seems to evolve between 
the US and the European regime. While US antitrust authorities tend to see buyers as general-
ly rational, European antitrust authorities worry about the “psychologically weak position” 
(COMP/E-2/36.041/PO — Michelin, no. 224) in which rebates place buyers, and the Europe-
an authorities are also concerned about buyers being at the mercy of the “suction effect” of 
rebates (see also Petit & Neyrinck, 2010). Hence, the question whether consumers are indeed 
capable of exercising an intelligent judgment of the transaction when confronted with targeted 
rebate schemes, or whether they are rather prone to suffer economic harm, is key to determin-
ing the legal assessment of rebates under unfair competition law. It may even influence the 
way antitrust law is applied vis-à-vis targeted rebates. The current paper tries to provide em-
pirical data for the key questions: do individuals stick to target rebate schemes, even when 
switching to an outside option yields a higher expected payoff? It also intends to ascertain 
which factors influence the degree of stickiness.  
Legal Assessment and Regulation of Target Rebates  
in the EU and the US 
There exist quite different kinds of rebates (e.g., Motta, 2009) that might need different regu-
lation. We exclusively focus on a type of rebates referred to as target rebate (also known as 
“all-unit discount”, “rollback rebate” or “threshold rebate”, each name stressing a different 
feature of basically the same rebate type). Target rebate describes a pricing scheme that 
grants a significant price reduction on all units bought during a certain reference period if the 
customer transgresses a certain threshold in purchases within that reference period. Such re-
bates place the customer in a situation of risk or even uncertainty
1 about the price if he cannot 
predict his demand during the reference period with sufficient precision.  
The central condition to prohibiting certain conduct under EU unfair competition law is that 
such conduct materially distorts the economic behavior with regard to the product of the aver-
age consumer who is targeted (Art. 4, directive 2005/29/EC). It is seen as a material distortion 
of this kind to limit the freedom of choice by any inappropriate influence. It has been argued 
that targeted rebates, which may unduly appeal to the gambling sentiments of consumers, can 
be illegal under Art. 4 of the Directive and under the law of the member states corresponding 
to it, if they can compromise the rationality of the purchasing decision (Köhler, 2008).  Under 
Sec. 5 of the US Federal Trade Commission Act, a particular kind of conduct may be prohib-
ited as unfair if it causes substantial consumer injury that consumers themselves could not 
reasonably have avoided and that is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers 
                                        
1   We distinguish risk from uncertainty in that under risk, probabilities are known at least in reasonable 
approximation, while under uncertainty, probabilities are unknown.   4
or competition that the practice produces (Beales, 2003). Rebates apparently have not (yet) 
been identified as a major problem under US unfair competition law. On the other hand, it 
should be straightforward that consumers suffer substantial injury when confronted with a 
pricing scheme that exploits certain properties of human reasoning. This has been established 
for consumer-aimed promotional practices like certain lotteries, games and contests 
(McManis, 2004). Indeed target rebates have a striking similarity to lotteries when the con-
sumer does not know in advance whether his requirements will allow him reasonably to reach 
the target threshold within the reference period.  
Beneficial effects of targeted rebates found in business-to-business retail markets will not be 
present on consumer markets. The need for harmonization of interests of upstream and down-
stream suppliers, which commonly drives the welfare-increasing effects of rebates, will not 
exist between consumers and sellers (see, for example, with regard to double marginalization 
Kolay, Ordover, & Shaffer, 2004; see as well, with similar conclusions, Greenlee, Reitman, & 
Sibley, 2008). 
In antitrust matters, US Courts have taken a rather lenient position towards rebates, for exam-
ple in Concord Boat v. Brunswick. The position of US authorities towards rebates is far from 
settled, though (see Olson et. al, 2002). In Europe, the Commission and the Courts have sup-
pressed target rebates applied by dominant companies (Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Commission; 
Michelin v. Commission I.; British Airways v. Commission; Michelin v. Commission II.; Intel 
v. Commission).  
Target rebates are very common on consumer markets. Several European fashion stores (e.g., 
Anson’s, Peek & Cloppenburg) run a target rebate scheme. They often include several targets 
that yield increasing rebates. Airlines and railway carriers offer “frequent-traveler programs”, 
requiring passengers to gather a certain amount of miles or points within a certain period of 
time to acquire premiums, gifts or the entitlement to supreme services. When consumers pre-
dict their demand in one of these schemes, they might not be certain about their exact de-
mand. Ultimately, deciding about how reasonable it is for them to buy into the rebate scheme 
involves risk.  
Prospect Theory Predictions Concerning the Stickiness of Rebates 
Standard rational choice theory (RCT) predicts that rebates could lead to a suction effect 
(OECD, 2002; European Commission, 2009), which means that once a consumer has bought 
a sufficiently large quantity in the rebate scheme, it can eventually be profit-maximizing for 
the consumer to keep buying exclusively in the rebate scheme, because the potential rebate is 
so large that no competitor can make a better offer. Enforcement agencies consider that domi-
nant incumbents can use this effect to foreclose markets for small entrant firms (OECD, 2002; 
European Commission, 2009). The literature on rebates cited above assumes that buyers 
strictly maximize payoffs according to RCT, and it discusses the resulting problems mainly   5
for antitrust.  We argue that from a behaviorally informed perspective, the effect of rebates 
should, however, be much worse than predicted by RCT. According to CPT, rebates should 
induce irrational stickiness of consumers due to reference point shifts – on top of the issues 
already discussed in the literature. Preferences should depend on reference points, which are 
influenced by hopes (Thaler, 1985; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979), goals (Heath, Larik, & Wu, 1999) and expectations (Abeler, Falk, Götte, & Huffmann, 
2009). 
Buyers will hope to reach the rebate and adopt reaching the rebate threshold as their goal. 
Hence, they will consider a failure to reach the rebate as a loss. In the loss frame, individuals 
usually seek risks (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and are therefore likely to prefer the risky 
option (i.e., stay in the rebate) over a safe outside option with equal expected value. Hence, 
prospect theory predicts that persons buy in target rebate schemes longer than would be pre-
dicted by RCT. We will refer to this as the stickiness effect of rebates. Based on CPT using 
standard parameters and assuming that the rebate payoff is adopted as reference point, we 
prove in Appendix A that irrational stickiness should be observed for all rebates for which not 
reading the rebate is sufficiently likely (i.e., the probability of reaching the rebate must be 
smaller than 76%; see fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; see also 
Schmidt & Zank, 2008). Furthermore, stickiness should increase with increasing magnitude of 
the rebate, that is, the difference between the overall payoffs for reaching vs. not reaching the 
rebate. Finally, when taking into account individual differences, stickiness should increase 
with increasing loss aversion. 
We investigate experimentally whether stickiness can be empirically observed and whether its 
size can be experimentally influenced. We thereby manipulate the magnitude of the rebate 
(e.g., overall 10 € rebate instead of 5 € rebate) and we investigate the influence of mere buy-
ing frequency in the rebate scheme (e.g., buying 10 instead of 5 objects) while holding the 
differences in total payoffs (rebate magnitude) constant.  
It should be noted that behavioral effects that go beyond what is captured in prospect theory, 
such as routine effects (Betsch, 2005; Betsch, Brinkmann, Fiedler, & Breining, 1999; Betsch, 
Haberstroh, Glöckner, Haar, & Fiedler, 2001), sunk cost effects (Arkes & Blumer, 1985), or 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Shultz & Lepper, 1996), might contribute to stickiness 
effects as well. We will focus our investigation on predictions by CPT, because of its promi-
nence and because, in contrast to the other models, it is sufficiently well specified in mathe-
matical terms. However, we take into account these effects to construct strong hypotheses for 
a critical test of CPT.   6
Previous Findings 
The predictive power of prospect theory for decision behavior has been supported by ample 
evidence using student participants (e.g., Glöckner & Betsch, 2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), but also using representative samples of the Dutch popu-
lation (Booij, Van Praag, & Van de Kuilen, 2010) and “in the wild” (e.g., Camerer, 2005). 
However, some limitations have also been demonstrated: Using a critical property approach, 
it could, for instance, been shown that CPT cannot account for several systematic effects in 
three-outcome gambles (Birnbaum, 2006, 2008a, 2008b). Furthermore, recent research indi-
cates that some effects predicted by CPT disappear in decisions from experience (Erev, Ert, & 
Yechiam, 2008; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004). Furthermore, process analysis indi-
cates that CPT should not be considered to be a process model for decision making (Glöckner 
& Herbold, in press). Nevertheless, many findings, including the ones mentioned above, sug-
gest that CPT is a reasonable paramorphic (as-if) model for choices in two-outcome prospects 
with stated probabilities. 
In contrast to the large literature on CPT, specific work on the effect of rebates is scarce. 
There is, however, one experiment that already demonstrated non-rational attraction effects of 
threshold rebates before (Beckenkamp & Maier-Rigaud, 2006). For simulated retail markets 
Beckenkamp and Maier-Rigaud showed that subjects stuck to a rebate scheme as well as to a 
discount scheme, even if maximizing the expected payoff suggested exiting. Our approach 
differs in four crucial respects: we focus on consumer decisions and unfair competition issues 
in contrast to retailer decisions; related to this issue, participants’ decision involved a kind of 
stock optimization, whereas we focus on simple consumer decisions; third, we investigate 
factors eventually influencing the magnitude of the effect based on predictions of CPT; 
fourth, in our task consumers decided themselves whether to enter the rebate or not which was 
not the case in the previous study. 
We thereby stripped down the design to the very essentials of a consumer target rebate 
scheme setting. The situation. we aim to capture is the following: a consumer has the possibil-
ity to enter a target rebate scheme for a product he intends to buy repeatedly in a certain time 
period. If he reaches the target (e.g., buying 10 items), the rebate will be granted for all items 
bought and the overall price will be extremely low; if he does not reach the target, however, 
the rebate will not be granted and the price will be high. The price of the outside option is be-
tween these two prices. After some time, a random event (“external shock”) decreases the 
likelihood that he or she can reach the target, so that it becomes rational to switch. We meas-
ure whether persons switch or stick to the rebate. 
We realize this by consecutive buying decisions (rounds) concerning tokens connected by a 
rebate condition and two chance moves in the critical round and in the last round representing 
the uncertainty about consumers’ demands. The critical round is omitted with a certain proba-
bility. Options are constructed so that according to RCT people should switch to a safe out-
side option if the critical round is omitted. The chance move in the last round is necessary to   7
induce uncertainty even after the realization of the critical round. We manipulate the number 
of repetitions (rounds) of buying and the magnitude of the rebate granted as between subjects’ 
conditions. 
In the experiment, we use rebate schemes with a sufficiently high probability for not reaching 
the rebate (after the critical round was omitted). As explained above, and as shown in Appen-
dix A, CPT predicts: 
Stickiness Hypothesis (H1): subjects who have consistently bought tokens up to the critical 
round do not exit the rebate scheme even if exit yields a higher expected payoff due to omis-
sion of the critical round.  
Beyond investigating the mere existence of the stickiness effect, we were interested whether 
CPT can also predict its severity. We thereby constructed our material to test two further hy-
potheses, including manipulations for which an effect was predicted and one for which a null-
effect was predicted. The second manipulation was also selected to test an assumption under-
lying core arguments recently used in the regulation of rebates. 
According to CPT, the stickiness effect should increase with increasing difference between 
the total payoffs of reaching vs. not reaching the rebates (see Appendix A). We therefore pre-
dict: 
Magnitude Hypothesis (H2): A rebate of larger magnitude leads to greater stickiness.  
According to CPT, the stickiness of rebates should mainly depend on magnitude, that is, the 
difference between high and low payoff (see Appendix A). It should not be influenced by the 
mere number of repetitions of previous buying. CPT therefore predicts the following null-
hypothesis: 
Repetition Null-Hypothesis (H3): The stickiness of rebates does not increase with the mere 
number of repetitions of buying if the magnitude of the rebate is constant. 
Note, that this is a strong null hypothesis. Previous findings indicate increased routine effects 
with repeated buying (Betsch, et al., 2001) which speaks against the CPT prediction. Addi-
tionally, with more repetitions subjects “invest” more money into the rebate. This may trigger 
a sunk cost effect (cf. Arkes & Blumer, 1985) that also works against the specific CPT predic-
tion. This hypothesis is also particularly interesting for practical reasons, because it captures 
the claim by the Court of Justice of the European Union that a longer reference period of a 
target rebate may lead to more market foreclosure (Michelin v. Commission I. no. 82; Michel-
in v. Commission II. no. 85). Of course, in the situations meant by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, the number of rounds and the differences between total payoffs will most 
likely be confounded. It is nevertheless relevant to differentiate between effects of magnitude 
and repetition.   8
Method 
Participants and design. Participants were recruited from a subject pool of about 900 individ-
uals using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The majority of participants were students of the Univer-
sity of Bonn, from a wide variety of subject backgrounds. A total of 64 participants (mean 
age: 24, 37 female) took part in the 6 sessions. The study lasted between 60 and 90 minutes 
and participants received a performance-contingent payoff (range: 0.94 € to 17.80 €; approx-
imately USD 1.40 to 26.70)
2 in exchange for their participation. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of four conditions of a 2 (repetition in buying: low vs. high) x 2 (rebate mag-
nitude: low vs. high) between-subjects design. 
Procedure. First, participants read the experimental instructions and answered a control ques-
tionnaire to ensure that they had understood the instructions and were able to calculate the 
possible payoffs. Subjects were provided with pocket calculators they could use at any time 
during the entire experiment. The main instructions are given in Appendix B. Payoffs in the 
experiment were stated in Euro. In each round of the experiment, participants could buy either 
a rebate token or choose an outside option.  In two of the rounds, however, buying a token 
was only possible with a certain probability which induced uncertainty about whether a per-
son would reach the rebate or not.  Persons were informed about the probabilities of both ran-
dom events which could turn out positive (i.e., decision between token or outside option pos-
sible) or negative (i.e., round omitted).  The critical round took place with a probability of pC 
= .83. The last round took place with a probability of pL = .15. pC and pL were independent 
and this was common knowledge to all subjects.  In order to receive the rebate for the tokens, 
the person needed to buy tokens in all but one round. Stated differently, the rebate was still 
granted if one of the random draws turned out negative.  Hence, the prior probability of reach-
ing the rebate was high (pR = pC + (1-pC)pL = .86).  Nevertheless, if the critical round did not 
take place, this probability was reduced dramatically to pR
* = pL = .15.   
The payoffs and probabilities were set in such a way that if the critical round was omitted (for 
a subject who bought tokens in every previous round), RCT and CPT would make contrary 
predictions about staying or quitting the target rebate option: the expected payoff for continu-
ing to buy tokens was lower than that for choosing the outside option. Hence, RCT predicts 
rational switching to the outside option (see Table 1, second-last row). In contrast, CPT pre-
dicts a stickiness effect of rebates and continued buying of rebate token (see Table 1, last 
row). We used buying behavior in the round after the critical round as the main dependent 
measure. 
Choice data in the following round was only informative if the critical round was indeed omit-
ted. To avoid data loss for cases in which this was not the case, we incorporated a strategy 
method. Thereby prior to the realization of the random event in the critical round, subjects 
committed themselves to what they would do if it turned out that the critical round was omit-
                                        
2   These payoffs include the gains and losses subjects incurred when they chose and played the lotteries 
measuring their risk preferences and loss aversion.   9
ted. If a round was omitted, it was not possible to choose the outside option either; the random 
event and the buying behavior in the following round was realized, and persons continued 
buying in subsequent rounds. 
After subjects had gone through the experiment, we elicited risk preferences and the loss 
aversion parameter  using the incentivized scales developed by Holt and Laury (2002) and 
Gächter, Johnson, and Herrmann (2007).  The Holt-Laury scale measures risk aversion by 
letting subjects choose between 10 pairs of lotteries. Each pair contains a low-risk lottery 
yielding 2 € with probability  and 1.60 € with probability 1- and a high-risk lottery yielding 
3.85 € and 0.10 € with the same probabilities ( = 0.1, 0.2, … ,1). The number of choices for 
the low-risk lottery is used as a measure for risk aversion.  If, for example, a participant 
chooses the low risk lottery in 7 (out of the overall 10) decisions, he has a risk-aversion score 
of 7 (which refers to a specific range of relative risk aversion scores; see Holt & Laury, 2002).  
The Gächter-Johnson-Herrmann-scale is based on six choices between playing a lottery or 
rejecting it. Each lottery has a fifty-fifty chance of winning 6 € or losing between 2 and 7 €. If 
the subject is, for example, not willing to play a lottery offering a 50:50 chance of winning 6 € 
and losing 3 €, it is assumed that the person has a  > 2.  
Material. In each round, participants had to decide whether to buy a token or to select an out-
side option while being provided with detailed information (Figure 1). The outside option was 
to earn 0.44 € per round in which it was chosen. For each token they bought, participants re-
ceived 1.30 € at the end of the experiment. This value represented the consumption utility of 
the token. Dependent on condition, the buying price before the rebate was either 1.10 € or 
1.25 €.  Hence, without a rebate, the payoff of the outside option was much higher than that of 
the tokens. If the rebate threshold was reached, however, the effective buying price was sub-
stantially reduced, so that then the payoff for each token was higher than the outside option.  
We manipulated the number of rounds in which tokens could be bought from low (10 rounds) 
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Figure 1: Information display in the decision tasks  
Round 3
You can either purchase a token or choose a direct payment.
Rebate: buy at least 
14 tokens
The value of your














Buytoken Don‘t buy token
 
To make the results comparable between conditions, we held the incentives for leaving the 
rebate scheme after the critical round, as well as the number of remaining rounds after the 
critical round, constant across conditions. Consequently, in the low repetition condition the 
critical round was Round 5, whereas it was Round 10 in the high repetition condition. Fur-
thermore, for all conditions the difference in expected payoffs for remaining in the rebate 
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Table 1: Manipulations and Expected Payoffs 
  Rebate Magnitude 
  Low  High 
  Repetition in Buying 
  Low High Low High 
Rebate Magnitude in € (after critical 
round omitted) 
5.06 5.10 9.05 9.01 
Repetitions in Buying (rounds)  10  15  10  15 
x1 (price per token w/o rebate)  1.10 €  1.10 €  1.25 €  1.25 € 
x2 (price per token with rebate)  0.56 €  0.75 €  0.25 €  0.61 € 
Prospect of staying in rebate (after 









Prospect of quitting rebate option 









EV for staying / quitting in €    2.36/2.63  3.36/3.63  1.76/2.03  2.00/2.28 
CPT V for staying / quitting  
(see Appendix A) 
-6.13/-7.53  -6.17/-7.60  -10.22/-13  -10.18/-12.93 
Note. Prospects are given in the format (payoff 1; probability 1; payoff 2). 
Results 
Out of 64 subjects, eleven switched back and forth between the rebate and the outside option 
at least once before the critical round. For these subjects, both RCT and CPT predicted to 
leave the rebate after the critical round was omitted. Four subjects did not buy a token in 
Round one and kept choosing the outside option consistently until the last round. This behav-
ior of avoiding a rebate scheme can be explained by a strong aversion to risk (see Table 3, 
below). The remaining 49 subjects (76%), which we will call target persons (because they are 
most informative for testing our hypotheses), entered the rebate scheme and started buying 
rebate tokens constantly until the critical round.  
In line with previous findings (e.g., Holt & Laury, 2002), our participants were mainly risk-
averse with an average score of 6.03 (SD=1.79), which corresponds to a relative risk aversion 
of 0.41< r < 0.68. Moreover, the Gächter-Johnson-Herrmann-scale showed that the subjects 
displayed loss aversion to a normal degree ( = 2.18, SD= 0.65; cf. Appendix A). Four per-
sons answered inconsistently (i.e., did not show a unique switching point, but switched back 
and forth between accepting and not accepting) and for them no loss-aversion score could be 
calculated.   12
Stickiness of Rebates 
Our main dependent measure was subjects’ choices immediately after the critical round, 
which were assessed using a strategy method.  In case the critical round had taken place, for 
target persons it yields a higher expected payoff to buy a rebate scheme token than choosing 
the outside option and CPT makes the same prediction. If the critical round is omitted, how-
ever, the outside option will yield a higher expected payoff and it would be rational to switch 
to the outside option.  CPT, by contrast, predicts sticking with the rebate. For both situations 
(i.e., critical round omitted or not), we coded whether persons choose the option that maxim-
izes their expected payoff (expected value / EV), that is, whether they decided in line with 
RCT or not. 
The results indicate a stickiness effect. The proportion of EV-maximizing choices was much 
higher if the critical round took place as compared to being omitted (Figure 2). In line with 
the CPT prediction, target persons (Figure 2, left) continued to buy in the rebate even if the 
critical round was omitted and it was EV-maximizing to quit the rebate. The proportion of 
EV-maximizers, if the critical round was not omitted and RCT and CPT made the same pre-
dictions, is much higher. This difference in proportions turned out significant in a McNemar 
test, χ
2
df=1 = 16.91, p < .001. Hence, we find strong support for our hypothesis H1 indicating 
that target rebates are sticky. In accordance with the predictions of CPT, our subjects opted 
for the choice that yielded greater risk and lower expected payoff.  
For the other persons (Figure 2, right) it was always rational not to buy the token what the 
majority of them also did, regardless of whether the critical round was omitted or not. There 
was no significant difference in proportions, McNemar χ
2
df=1 = 1.0, p = .32.  










target persons (N=49) others (N=15)
critical round omitted (EV<>CPT)
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Effects of Magnitude and Repetition on Stickiness 
To test our hypotheses H2 and H3, which state that stickiness increases with magnitude of the 
rebate, but not with mere repetition in buying, we analyzed choice behavior in the critical 
round separately for the four conditions, considering the target persons only (Figure 3). A 
tendency towards a stickiness effect was found in all four conditions, although the effect 
reached conventional significance levels for the two low-magnitude conditions only (low 
magnitude & low repetition: McNemar χ
2
df=1;N=16 = 4.45, p = .035; high magnitude & low rep-
etition: McNemar χ
2
df=1;N=8 = 1.80, p = .18; low magnitude & high repetition: McNemar 
χ
2
df=1;N=11 = 10.0, p = .001; high magnitude & high repetition: McNemar χ
2
df=1;N=14 = 2.00, p = 
.16).   
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For a regression-based analysis, we generated a sticky-buying score.  The score was set to 1 if 
the person bought the token after the critical round was omitted and 0 otherwise.  The score 
hence indicated whether persons performed sticky-buying (1) or not (0). We conducted a lo-
gistic regression
3 with this sticky-buying score as dependent variable and the two condition 
variables and their interaction as predictors and risk aversion, loss aversion and gender as fur-
ther control variables (Table 2).  
 
 
                                        
3   We estimated the equation           n nX X Y ... 1 1 0  with logit. A value of Y=1 indicated the deci-
sion to keep buying in the rebate scheme, Y=0 indicated the decision not to buy in the rebate scheme. The 
variables X1 to X7 are the variables and interactions listed in the regression Table 2.   14
Table 2: Three Logistic Regression Models Predicting Stickiness  
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Sticky-Buying Sticky-Buying Sticky-Buying 
Repetition  high  0.772 1.142 1.141 
(0-no, 1-yes; centered)  (1.01)  (1.39)  (1.19) 
     
Magnitude High  -1.194  -1.413+  -1.955* 
(0-no, 1-yes; centered)  (-1.59)  (-1.77)  (-2.06) 
     
IE Repetition*Magn.  -2.850+  -3.356*  -3.196+ 
  (-1.91) (-2.07) (-1.79) 
     
Gender   -1.576*  -2.051* 
(0-female, 1-male)    (-2.28)  (-2.53) 
     
Risk Aversion Score      0.280 
(0-10)    (0.79) 
     
Loss Aversion ()         -0.522 
    (-0.81) 
     
Constant 0.762*  1.578**  1.273 
  (1.97) (2.86) (0.58) 
Observations  49 49 45 
Pseudo R
2  0.108 0.193 0.278 
Note. Raw coefficients for a logistic regression on sticky-buying (buying choices after the critical round, 
i.e., when round 5 or 10 was omitted). Buying indicates stickiness preventing subjects from maximizing 
expected payoffs. z-statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors were used. Model 3 includes four 
observations less due to missing loss-aversion scores.  
+ p < 0.10, 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001. 
We find a significant effect of our magnitude manipulation on stickiness. In contrast to the 
magnitude hypothesis H2, however, stickiness decreases with increasing magnitude of the 
rebate (see Figure 3) and H2 has to be rejected. There was no significant effect of repetition 
on stickiness that allows remaining the null-hypothesis H3. However, it has to be taken into 
account that the power of the analysis was relatively low (1 - β = .56; assuming: odds-ratio = 
2, p(Y=1|X=1)H0=.5; two-sided test) (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Further exper-
iments with more power are necessary to double-check this result.   15
We also find a (marginally) significant interaction effect of magnitude and repetition, which 
was not predicted by CPT. High magnitude combined with high repetition frequency de-
creased the stickiness of a rebate and led to considerably more rational buying behavior. 
Additionally we find a significant gender effect. Female subjects were more inclined to stick 
to the rebate than male subjects, once they had entered the rebate scheme. Risk aversion and 
loss aversion had no effect on stickiness (after the person entered the rebate), although CPT 
predicts that increasing loss aversion should lead to higher stickiness (see Appendix A).  
Individual Differences in Entering the Rebate 
We were further interested in the question whether there were individual differences in enter-
ing the rebate scheme in the first place, dependent on people’s risk aversion and loss aversion. 
One might expect that more risk-averse and loss-averse persons avoid entering rebate 
schemes already in the first place. As mentioned above, the large majority of persons entered 
the rebate scheme and bought in it until the critical round (N=49), but there was also a minori-
ty of persons who avoided the rebate altogether and chose the outside option from the begin-
ning (N=4). We found higher risk aversion in these rebate avoiders (M=7.2, SE=1.18) com-
pared to target persons (M=5.8, SE=0.17), which was marginally significant in a nonparamet-
ric test (Mann-Whitney: p =.07; one-sided). Similarly, rebate avoiders had higher loss aver-
sion (M=2.47, SE=0.53) compared to target persons (M=2.17, SE=0.08), which was also 
marginally significant (Mann-Whitney: p =.08; one-sided).  
Interpretation and Discussion 
In this paper, we report results from a first experiment that investigates target rebates in a 
comprehensive task mirroring the particularities of consumer purchases. We used Cumulative 
Prospect Theory (CPT) to derive predictions concerning buying behavior in rebates. The core 
finding of this paper is that, in line with CPT predictions, target rebates induce a stickiness 
effect in that they impede customers switching from the rebate product to better (payoff-
maximizing) outside options. Therefore, target rebates have an underestimated potential to 
harm consumers. The stickiness effect seems to be strong in that it led more than 60% of the 
(target) persons to choose the option with the lower expected value. 
Furthermore, we investigated the influence of rebate magnitude and buying repetition on the 
size of the stickiness effect. Stickiness significantly decreases with increasing magnitude of 
the rebate, although CPT predicts the opposite effect. A null-effect of repetition on stickiness 
was in line with CPT predictions.  Note, however, that the latter cannot be considered clear 
evidence in favor of the theory because the power of the analysis was relatively low.    16
We observed an interaction effect of rebate magnitude and repetition on stickiness in that 
stickiness was particularly reduced if both factors were high. This effect was not predicted by 
CPT. A possible explanation for this effect might be that a high number of repetitions and a 
high magnitude place the subjects in a situation where much of the payoff was at risk. One 
could speculate that this risk may have increased subjects’ general alertness and awareness 
towards changes in the environment. 
Furthermore, we found that people’s loss aversion had no effect on stickiness. CPT would 
have predicted a positive relation. Interestingly, there was a gender effect, as female partici-
pants showed a higher stickiness to rebates (even when controlling for differences in risk 
aversion and loss aversion). Finally, we found preliminary support that there seem to be indi-
vidual differences which determine people’s willingness to enter rebate schemes in the first 
place.  Rebate avoiders seem to be more risk-averse and loss-averse persons compared to per-
sons entering a rebate scheme. 
Implications for the Regulation of Target Rebates 
The first and most important implication is that target rebates induce a stickiness effect in 
consumers. A model that assumes agents to maximize expected payoffs is not well-suited to 
predict the effects of target rebates on consumers. This fact increases the potential of target 
rebates to inflict substantial harm on consumers, and to compromise the rationality of con-
sumers’ purchasing decision because consumers will end up with less rent on average than 
they would end up with in the absence of the rebate scheme. This can make targeted rebates 
illegal under US and EU legislation on unfair competition. It may even increase the potential 
of targeted rebates to foreclose consumer markets to entrants: the entrant has to compensate 
the additional attraction of rebates that we call stickiness by selling his product even more 
cheaply than he would do otherwise.  
We found no support for the Court of Justice of the European Union’s opinion that a longer 
reference period that would induce increased repetitions in buying increases the potential for 
market foreclosure. There was no effect on stickiness with regard to the instances of buying 
repetitions.  
Implications for Modeling Choice Behavior for Target Rebates 
The stickiness effect predicted by CPT (with the additional assumption that reference points 
are shifted to the rebate payoff) was clearly supported by the data. However, we also find that 
the reversed effect of rebate magnitude, the interaction between magnitude and repetition, and 
the null effect for loss aversion on stickiness cannot be easily explained by CPT.  Hence, alt-
hough CPT explains the data better than rational-choice theory, there is a need for further re-  17
finements and rebate-specific extensions in order to develop a more comprehensive model for 
buying decisions in rebate environments, namely one that fully accounts for our findings.  
Caveats 
In our experiment, subjects act in an environment of risk, knowing precisely all of the proba-
bilities involved in the procedure. In repeated purchasing situations outside of the lab, this 
will hardly ever be the case. Buyers will rather act under uncertainty – not knowing the prob-
abilities with which they reach a demand set. Similarly, they do not know whether a cheaper 
offer will be available in the future. Considering that uncertainty about probabilities adds an-
other layer of complexity to the problem, it seems reasonable to assume, however, that a find-
ing of non-rational behavior under risk will generalize to an environment of uncertainty.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that we used a one-shot experiment. This was to prevent sub-
jects from playing strategies of hedging risks by diversification and to induce subjects to take 
the one shot they had as seriously as possible. Diversification strategies would render the data 
noisy and divert the findings from what we actually wanted to investigate. However, it might 
be argued that our one-shot method did not allow subjects to learn the task. To circumvent 
this problem, we took great care that our subjects understood the task immediately from the 
instructions and let them calculate the expected payoff in a sample task to assure a high level 
of comprehension.  
Because our experimental task shares the crucial features of buying in rebate schemes in retail 
markets, its results can cautiously be generalized to them as well. Especially when retail units 
are small and decisions are made by individuals, our results are likely to apply. This condition 
seems to be fulfilled in the Michelin cases because retailers apparently included small car re-
pair shops. The European Commission therefore appears to be right not to have ignored the 
psychological state of (retailing) buyers in its decision. 
Conclusions 
Overall, we conclude that the stickiness effect predicted by CPT is robust, but further research 
is necessary to investigate the determinants of its strength, to explore possible underlying pro-
cesses, and to develop more comprehensive models.  Our results indicate that a regulation of 
target rebates that assumes rational consumers will underestimate their potential harm. Con-
sequently, previous arguments that have been made based on the rationality assumption 
should be supplemented by considering behavioral effects. Specifically, the demonstrated 
stickiness effect of target rebates should be taken into account in their regulation, since it 
might cause harm to consumers and could even lead to market foreclosure.   
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Let x1 and x2 be the possible monetary outcomes (payoffs) for a prospect and assume p1 and 1-p1 
to be the probabilities that the respective outcomes realize. The expected value for this prospect 
is given by: 
2 1 1 1 ) 1 ( x p x p EV              ( 1 )  
and according to rational choice theory persons should be indifferent between this prospect and 
any equivalent cash amount c:  
EV c  .             ( 2 )  
According to CPT, the value V of a prospect with outcomes x1 ≤  … ≤  xk ≤  0 ≤  xk+1 ≤  … ≤  xn is 
given by: 
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with v as continuous and strictly increasing utility function satisfying v(0) = 0, and π
+ and π
– as deci-
sion weights, for gains and losses respectively. Decision weights result from rank-dependent trans-
formation of the outcome probabilities, considering gains and losses separately. This means that the 
same probability can result in different decision weights, dependent on whether it belongs to a high 
or a low outcome. Decision weights are defined by: 
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- being the probability weighting function for gains and losses, respectively. Hence, the 
lowest negative outcome and the highest positive outcome are transformed using the respective trans-
formation functions described in the next section. The weights for probabilities of losses (i.e., i < k) 
conceptually represent the marginal contribution of the respective probability to the total probability 
of worse outcomes and the weights for probabilities of gains (i.e., j > k) represent the marginal con-
tribution of the respective probability to better outcomes. 
For CPT, several functional forms of v, and w
+/w
- have been suggested (see Stott, 2006, for an 
overview).  We use the classic one-parameter implementation of the value function and the 
weighting function suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1992):  
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The risk-aversion parameters α and β capture the curvature of the s-shaped value function. The 
parameters γ and δ capture the inverted s-shape of the weighting function, in the domains of 
gains and losses, respectively. The loss-aversion parameter λ induces the increased steepness of 
the value function in the domain of losses. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) suggested the follow-
ing parameters: α = β = .88, γ = .69, δ = .61, λ = 2.25.  
Let us assume that x2 is adopted as a reference point and payoffs are perceived as differences 
from x2.  Consequently, x2 has a utility of zero and x1 has a negative (or zero) utility and the val-
ue VP of the prospect is given by: 
  ) ( )) ( ( ) ( 1 2 1 1 2 1 p w x x x x v VP
       
   .        ( 7 )  
Choosing the cash equivalent c of the prospect (equation 2) will be considered a sure loss be-
cause it will also always be smaller than x2. According to core predictions of prospect theory, 
people will prefer a risky option over a sure loss with equal expected value which follows from 
the fact that the utility function v is convex for losses. Formally, this results in the following val-
ue of the cash equivalent Vc:  
  )) ( ( ) ( 2 2 x c x c v Vc                ( 8 )  
And when substituting c by equations 1 and 2:  
     1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 )) ( ( )) ) 1 ( ( ( p x x x p x p x Vc           .       ( 9 )  
The difference between VP and Vc is given by: 
     1 2 1 1 2 1 )) ( (   ) ( )) ( ( p x x p w x x V V c P        
 ,       ( 1 0 )  
which can also be written as: 
   ) ) ( )) ( ( 1 1 2 1
   p p w x x V V c      
 .         ( 1 1 )  
The first term of equation 11 will be negative for all x2 > x1 and its magnitude increases with in-
creasing difference between x1 and x2. Taking into account the values for parameters β = .88 and 
δ = .61, mentioned above, the second term is negative for all probabilities p1 > .24; which is 
where the functions w
-(p1) and p1
β intersect (Figure A1).  Hence, for all p1 > .24 the value of the 
prospect is higher than its cash equivalent and (everything else being equal) the difference in-
creases with increasing difference between x2 and x1.  
Choices between the prospect and the cash equivalent will most likely not be deterministic.  It is 
more likely that they follow a probabilistic function such as a logistic-choice function in which 
the probability for choosing one option over the other increases with its advantage in VP (i.e., the 
absolute difference between VP – Vc). 
Taking an individual differences perspective and considering only prospects with sufficiently 
likely lowest outcomes to prefer the prospect over the cash equivalent, the degree to which the 26 
risky prospects are preferred over the cash equivalent should increase with increasing loss aver-
sion λ.  Increasing risk aversion β increases the magnitude of the first term, but decreases the 
magnitude of the second term in equation 11, and the overall effect is therefore complex. 
Figure A1: Difference in decision weights according to the second term in equation 11 as a function of 










































Relation to Rebates 
If one accepts that rebates lead to adopting the payoff of reaching the rebate (i.e., x2 = the maxi-
mal payoff) as reference point, then, according to CPT, rebates should induce persons to contin-
ue buying in the target rebate scheme, even if an outside option has the higher expected value. 
This, however, should only hold when considering rebates with sufficiently large probability of 
failing to reach the rebate (p1 = 1 - pR > .24). Hence, in our paradigm CPT predicts entering the 
rebate because 1 - pR = .14 and stickiness to the rebate after the critical round was omitted be-
cause 1 - pR
* = .85.  The probability to stick to the rebate (i.e., staying in the rebate although it 
does not maximize expected value) should increase with increasing difference between VP and Vc 
which is a monotonously increasing function of the difference between the high and the low 
overall payoff that can be reached with the rebate option.  It should be independent of the repeti-
tions of buying when holding the difference in payoffs constant. From an individual-difference 
perspective, stickiness should increase with increasing loss aversion and might be influence in a 
complex way by risk aversion. 
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Appendix B 
In the first part of the experiment, you can make a buying decision in each round. There are 10 
buying decisions in total. The decision is whether or not to purchase a token. You will receive 
information about the repeated decision in the form presented below. [Figure omitted] 
Please read this information carefully now and during the experiment. In this situation, each to-
ken costs 1.10 € and has an exchange value of 1.30 €; that is, at the end of the experiment you 
will be credited 1.30 € for each token that you purchased during the experiment. In each round, 
you may purchase one token for the price of 1.10 €. Alternatively, you can also decide not to 
purchase a token. For each round in which you decide not to buy a token, you will be credited 
0.44 € immediately as direct payment. 
At the end of the experiment, you will be granted a rebate of 49% on all purchased tokens, pro-
vided that you have purchased at least 9 tokens during the first part of the experiment. In this 
case, the purchase price, which you spent on the tokens, will be reduced by 49% to 0.56 €.  
[Figure omitted] Rounds 5 and 10 are omitted with certain probabilities. If a round is omitted, 
you can neither buy a token nor choose the direct payoff. Round 5 is omitted with a probability 
of 17% and Round 10 is omitted with a probability of 85%. [Figure omitted] Dependent on 
whether Round 5 is omitted or not, the probability for your being able to play 9 rounds varies. 
Because the experiment can take different directions, depending on whether Round 5 is omitted, 
after Round 4 you will be asked how you will decide in Round 5 if it takes place, and how you 
will decide in Round 6 if Round 5 takes place. After these decisions, the computer will deter-
mine whether or not Round 5 takes place and you will make the decisions you indicated. If you 
decide not to buy in Round 5 and the round is played, the computer will only allow you to make 
this decision. If Round 5 is omitted, the computer will, for Round 6 also, only allow you to make 
the decision you indicated. In the following rounds, similar to Rounds 1 to 4, you can again 
choose between buying the token and the direct payment. 
Your payment for the first part is calculated as follows: 
If the rebate is granted: 
Rounds in which tokens were bought x (Exchange value of the tokens – Price of the tokens) + 
Rounds in which direct payment was chosen x Value of the direct payment + Price of the tokens 
x Rounds in which tokens were bought x Rebate 
If the rebate is not granted: 
Rounds in which tokens were bought x (Exchange value of the tokens – Price of the tokens) + 
Rounds in which direct payment was chosen x Value of the direct payment 
[Instructions for measures of risk aversion and loss aversion and example calculations are omit-
ted.] 